Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision
Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Timo Fischer
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal (2016), 10(3): 235-256
Research Question
What are the lending decision criteria of U.S. venture debt lenders?
Why Do We Care
We care because understanding the dynamics of venture debt financing is crucial, as it lies at the intersection of venture capital and traditional debt. This form of financing plays an essential role in supporting start-ups, particularly in high-tech industries with limited cash flow and tangible assets. Insights into how venture debt lenders make decisions can help both entrepreneurs seeking funding and investors looking to understand market mechanisms better.
What Did We Do
We conducted a discrete choice experiment with 55 senior venture debt lenders in the U.S., targeting institutions covering at least 60 percent of the U.S. venture debt market. The survey included multiple hypothetical lending scenarios with varying attributes such as cash flow, tangible assets, patents, and VC backing, leading to a dataset of 2,825 observations.
What Did We Find
Our analysis yielded three primary findings. First, VC backing significantly increases the chance of obtaining venture debt, particularly for early-stage companies. Second, the provision of patents as collateral increases the likelihood of receiving loans, comparable to that of tangible assets. Third, the amount of warrants offered also positively influences the probability of securing debt financing, with high warrants having a pronounced effect.
Primary Data
- 55 senior venture debt lenders from 31 institutions in the U.S.
- These data come from a discrete choice experiment with 2,825 observations collected in November 2010
Assumptions
- Respondents are assumed to provide honest and informed preferences based on actual lending criteria
- The scenarios in the discrete choice experiment represent realistic lending decisions made by venture debt lenders
- Patents are assumed to have a signaling effect that can reduce information asymmetry in loan evaluations